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The Efficacy of Merit Review of Common Stock 
Offerings: Do Regulators Know 
More than the Market? 
Marianne M. Jennings* 
October. This is one of the peculiarly dangerous months to 
speculate stocks in. The others are July, January, September, 
April, November, May, March, June, December, August and 
February. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Pudd'nhead Wilson 
Mark Twain, 1898 
As long as there has been greed, there have been financial 
schemes and frauds created to capitalize on the greed in all of 
us and to fulfill the greed of their sponsors. 1 The desire to 
enjoy a high rate of return is part of a sophisticated investor's 
strategy and the driving force behind the inexperienced, 
smaller investor's decision to venture into higher risk securities 
purchases. Government regulation has attempted to create a 
level playing field for all investors through various means of 
scrutinizing proposed sales of securities. 2 
* Professor, Department of Business Administration, College of Business, 
Arizona State University. A project as complex as one that forms the basis of this 
article requires much assistance and cooperation. The author appreciates the work 
of Sheila Bond, April Kasl, Allison Bond Jones, Stephanie Bond Phair, Janette 
Kasl and Tim West who gathered and assimilated the data on securities 
registrations. The author also appreciates the legal research assistance provided by 
Laurel Wala and David Gass. 
1. While not all stocks or exchanges have been plagued with fraud, schemes, 
and greed, they have facilitated many investor losses for some time. As early as 
the late 1700s, there were commodity exchanges on Wall Street. The New York 
Stock Exchange was formally organized in 1R27. See J. Baer & 0. Saxon, 
Commodities Exchanges and Futures Trading, Principles and Operating Methods 
(1949). 
2. It has been noted: 
In a world with . . . no mandatory disclosure system, firms could 
remain silent with impunity. If they disclosed, they would do so in any 
way they wished ... [t]hey could attempt to sell securities with ads in 
glossy magazines and on television featuring sexy models or herds of 
bulls, as sellers of other products (including brokerage services) do. 
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At the federal level, Congress created a system for pre-sale 
registration and approval for proposed offerings through the 
Federal Securities Act of 1933.3 The federal registration 
process is one of disclosure. Based on the rationale that a full 
disclosure of the firm's past events serves some value to 
investors in making their investment decisions, the federal 
registration process seeks to ensure that investment decisions 
may be based on full information.4 
Even so, that federal "full information" or "full and fair" 
disclosure standard was insufficient for many state regulators 
since full disclosure does not preclude fraudulent or high risk 
offerings.5 Many states thus enacted securities regulations 
that required an examination of the merits of the proposed 
securities offerings.6 These blue-sky laws7 were enacted in 
A mandatory disclosure system substantially limits firms' ability to 
remain silent. Just as importantly, it controls the time, place and manner 
of disclosure. Firms must wait until they file a registration statement 
before saying anything that may be construed as touting (the "gun 
jumping" rule); they must wait until the registration statement is effective 
and a prospectus has been delivered before putting anything else in 
writing (the "free writing" rule); they must mail prospectuses and proxy 
statements at designated items but not resort to ads on television. 
What does a mandatory disclosure system add to the prohibition of 
fraud? The implicit public-interest justification for disclosure rules is that 
markets produce "too little" information. 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 680-81 (1984). 
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a - 77aa (1989). 
4. Some dispute the theory that full disclosure is helpful in a regulatory sense 
since under the "efficient market hypothesis" it is maintained that all existing 
information about an offering is reflected in the price of the securities and any 
detailed disclosure of past performance is simply historical and of little value in 
predicting future securities performance. See, e.g., George J. Benston, Required 
Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 
19.'34, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973); James S. Mofsky & Robert T. Tollison, 
Demerit in Merit Regulation, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 367, 368 (1977); See also, Eugene 
F. Fama, et al., The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 INT'L 
ECON. REV. 1 (1969). 
5. Although many states incorporate full disclosure standards, their regulation 
goes beyond that, to the merits. Both 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1988) and Section 18 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 authorize such separate regulation to wit: "Nothing in this 
subchapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency 
or office performing like functions) of any state or territory of the United States, or 
the District of Columbia, over any security or any person." 
6. Kansas was the first state to enact securities laws (1911). By 1913 there 
were twenty-three states with some form of securities law. See, LoUIS Loss & 
EDWARD M. COWE'IT, BLUE SKY LAW 3-10 (1958). For a more complete historical 
perspective, see, ld. Most of the state regulatory schemes were merit-based; see 
Ernest W. Walker & Beverly B. Hadaway, Merit Standards Revisited: An Empirical 
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response to the 1907 panic. They permitted state regulators to 
require additional information and to review the offerings on 
the basis of various standards of evaluation. 8 
The wisdom of merit regulation has been much questioned 
and debated. Issues raised in the ongoing debates are (1) 
whether merit statutes impede firms' ability to raise capital; 
and (2) in view of the costs of the often extensive filings and 
reviews in merit states, whether merit review provides any 
additional information not already available and analyzed by 
the market.9 Several studies of offerings filed in merit 
review states have been conducted by evaluating the financial 
performance of the firms seeking approval in such states. 10 
Both the studies' data and the financial analyses have been 
criticized for various omissions and methodologies.n 
The research in this article evaluates the efficacy of 
Arizona's merit review standards in light of criticisms of 
previous studies.12 Even though the full impact of these merit 
standards cannot be determined, 13 this article focuses on the 
Analysis of the Efficacy of Texas Merit Standards, 7 J. CORP. L. 651, 651-52 (1982). 
7. "Blue sky laws" refers to state laws regulating the sale and registration of 
securities. The term originated in Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917) in 
which the Court described fraudulent securities as "speculative schemes which have 
no more basis than so many feet of 'blue sky'." Id. at 550. 
8. Those standards of evaluation are discussed infra at pp. 10-19 and notes 
19-46. 
9. For a discussion of costs see, JAMES S. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON 
NEW BUSINESS PROMOTIONS at 31 (1971). See also, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 
4, at 367-368. 
10. See, e.g., Conrad G. Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in the Merit 
Requirements, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 79 (Wisconsin study); Ernest W. Walker & 
Beverly B. Hadaway, supra note 6 (Texas). Contra, Hugh H. Makens, Who Speaks 
{or the Investor? An Evaluation of the Assault on Merit Regulation, 13 BALTIMORE 
L. REV. 435 (1984). The Goodkind study is criticized by James Mofsky and Robert 
Tollison in Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 4, at 369. For a review of the types of 
merit regulation and discussion of regulatory and business concerns see, Report on 
State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 Bus. LAW. 7R5 (1986). 
11. Mofsky & Tollison, supra, note 4, at 371. Makens, supra, note 10, at 455-
56. 
12. Elaboration regarding those criticisms is found infra, part III. 
13. For example, it is impossible to determine what types of firms are 
effectively precluded from the registration process because of cost and complexity; 
or what firms choose not to register in Arizona because of its strict merit 
standards. Mofsky & Tollison note: 
We do not know how many new firms fail to come into existence because of 
the blue sky laws. Nor do we know the number of offerings not made in 
some states but made in others where the merit standards are less 
intolerable. That information is obviously critical in assessing the costs of 
state securities regulation. 
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post-registration financial performance of firms registering 
offerings in Arizona during the years 1984 - 1987. Those 
performing the study examined both approved and withdrawn 
offerings. 14 The results appear in Parts IV and V after Parts 
II and III, respectively, present an examination of merit review 
regulation and previous studies. 
II. MERIT REVIEW STATUTES-TYPES AND SCOPE 
Recent reforms by the SEC of small and private offerings 
have served to reduce the impact of state merit statutes on 
raising capital since those rules are largely the result of state 
regulators working with the SEC and Congress to establish a 
more universal exemption system for securities registration. 
Regulation D15 is perhaps the strongest evidence of a spirit of 
cooperation in making federal and state standards more 
uniform. 16 However, even given the parallels of some state 
statutes with Regulation D, there remain twenty-five states 
that recognize only some of Regulation D's exemptions. 17 State 
Mofsky & Tollison supra, note 4, at 369. 
14. Although the Securities Division (hereinafter "Division") of the Arizona 
Corporation Commission has the authority to deny a securities registration, no 
such denials were found. The common practice seems to be the firm's withdrawal 
of the offering upon significant objection by the Division or upon requests for 
additional information. Some withdrawals result when the Division remains 
unsatisfied with explanations and information, and the parties reach an impasse. 
15. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-508 (1992). 
16. Regulation D resulted from congressional directives in the Small Business 
Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(3)(c)(1989))* which was the Congressional response to 
demands for uniformity and simplicity in the registration and sale of securities at 
state and federal levels and the authorization in the Omnibus Small Business 
Capital Formation Act of 1980 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a)-(c)(1989))* which 
permitted the SEC: 
To cooperate with any association composed of duly constituted 
representatives of state governments whose primary assignment is the 
regulation of securities business within those states for the development 
of a uniform exemption from registration for small issuers which can be 
agreed upon among several states or between the States and the Federal 
Government. 
15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(c)(1) and (c)(3). 
Twenty states now recognize Regulation D exemptions as state exemptions. 
17. The following state laws have exemptions compatible with Parts 505 and 
506 of Regulation D: ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.240 (1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-
1844 (1987 & Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-113.(2)(0) (1987); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 36-490(b)(9)(A),(B) (West 1987 & Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
18, § 5108, Rule 9 (b)(9)(11) (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-9 (Harrison 1990); IDAHO 
CODE § 30-1435, Rule 27 (1983 & Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1262(o) (1988 
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securities laws remain a potpourri of regulation with varying 
standards, requirements and exemptions. 18 However, states 
& Supp. 1991), KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-6 (1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:709 
(West 19R7 & Supp. 1990); MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602, Rule 15 
(1985 & Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110A, § 402(b)(a)(c) (West 1990); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 4fil.803.7 (West 1989) (Mich. Stat. Ann. § 19.776(402) 
(Callaghan 1990 & Supp. 1992)); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 409.402, 30-54.210 (Vernon 
1990); MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-10-105, Rule 6.10.120 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-
1111 (1991 & Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-60(b) (West Supp. 1990) (as to 
offerings other than real estate syndications); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 401,406 
(West 1987 & Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 59.025 (1989); OR. ADMIN. R. Rule 
815-36-fiOO (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-320 (Law. Co-op. 1987); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 4R-2-103, Rule 0780-4-2-.04 (1988 & Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-
14 (Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4203a, 4204a (1984 & Supp. 1992); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 13.1-fi14(b)(14), Rule 503 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1992); VA. R. STATE 
CORP. CoMM'N, Rule 503, Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 60,439; W. VA. CODE §§ 32-3-
305, 15.06 (1992). 
Kansas and Tennessee follow the North American Association of Securities 
Administrators (NAASA), and limit their exemptions to Rule 505. Colorado and 
New York regulate only intrastate offerings (whereas Regulation D exemptions 
apply only if the offering is interstate). Oregon and Alaska register by 
coordination-federal approval or exemption constitutes compliance with their 
requirements. 
The following state statutes provide exemptions based on the number of 
purchasers, but the exemptions do not parallel Regulation D; hence, a special 
structure would be necessary under these statues: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
517.061(11)(a)(1), Rules 3E-500.05 to .07 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. 
STAT. ch. 121Y2, § 137.4(G) (Smith-Hurd 1960 & Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
502.203(9)(a) (West 1991 & Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80A.15 sub.2(h) (West 
1986 & Supp. 1992), MINN. R. 2875.0180 (1989); MISS. CoDE ANN. § 75-71-203(9), 
(10) (1972 & Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.530(11)(a) (1990) (25 purchasers); 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-203(d) (Purdon 1965 & Supp. 1992) (25 purchasers); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-31A-402 (1991) (25 purchasers for domestic 
corporations, 5 for other issuers). 
State statutes with only Rule 506 exemptions are: ALA. CoDE § 8-6-11 (1984 & 
Supp. 1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-504(a)(14) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991), 
Interpretative Opinion, Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 10,661; CAL. CORP. CoDE § 
25102(0 (West 1977 & Supp. 1992); CAUF. LOCK REG. tit. 10, Rules 260.102.12 to 
.14 (1992), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 11,780A-C; IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1(b)(10) 
(Burns Supp. 1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.410 (Baldwin 1990); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10502 (1988 & Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-17, N.C. 
ADMIN. CODE tit. 18 r.1206 (1990 & Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.03 
(Baldwin 1989); TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 8.401 (West 1991), Rule 109.4(11), 
3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'II fi5,554; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 21.20.320 (West 
1989); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 460-44A-501-503, fi06 (1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
551.23(10) (West 1988). 
The other states (Hawaii, Wyoming, North Dakota, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, and Rhode Island) have peculiar exemption requirements. 
Ten jurisdictions (Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, D.C., Indiana, New York, New 
Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Washington) recognize Rule 504 exemptions. 
18. This "potpourri" of regulation is troubling to some in the sense that the 
lack of uniformity places the United States at a distinct disadvantage in 
international competition and international financial markets. See, e.g., Marianne 
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with merit standards 19 maintain some common denominators 
M. Jennings, Arizona C:orporation Commission v. Media Products. Inc.: Clarification 
of Competinp Federal and State Securities Regulation, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449 
(1989) ("the wisdom of such a piecemeal approach in a national capital market 
governed by a significantly detailed federal regulatory scheme is questionable.") !d. 
at 462. See also, Roberta S. Karmel, Blue-Sky Merit Ref?ulation: Benefit to Investors 
or Burden on Commerce? fi3 BROOKLYN L. REV. 105 (1987) in which the author 
noted: 
State merit regulation is a burden on interstate commerce and stands 
as an obstacle to the achievement of the SEC's statutory goals of 
facilitating capital formation and the establishment of a national market 
system (NMS). Further, the basic philosophical conflict between federal 
and state regulation will become increasingly troublesome as the SEC 
grapples with the problems of regulating the market for corporate control 
of large public companies and participating in the regulation of 
international capital markets. 
!d. at 107 (footnote omitted). 
19. All states regulate securities registration in some way. Thirty-nine states 
have adopted or substantially adopted the Uniform Securities Act, a product of 
NAASA's work with securities lawyers and legal scholars including Louis Loss as a 
principal. Sel' 7B U.L.A. fi10 (198fi). The thirty-nine states (including Puerto Rico) 
are as follows: 
Alabama Kentucky North Carolina 
Alaska Maryland Oklahoma 
Arkansas Massachusetts Oregon 
Color(ldo Michigan Pennsylvania 
Connecticut Minnesota Puerto Rico 
Delaware Mississippi South Carolina 
District of Columbia Missouri Tennessee 
Guam Montana Utah 
Hawaii Nebraska Virginia 
Idaho Nevada Washington 
Indiana New Hampshire West Virginia 
Iowa New Jersey Wisconsin 
Kansas New Mexico Wyoming 
For state citations to U.L.A., see Michael Newman, Municipal Securities and 
StatP SecuritiPs Laws: A NPw Look, 1:~ U. BALT. L. REV. 558-59 n.::l (1984). 
The following states are generally regarded as "merit" 
of merit regulation is exercised over proposed offerings: 
Alabama Kentucky 
Alaska Massachusetts 
Arizona Michigan 
Arkansas Minnesota 
California Missouri 
Colorado Nebraska 
Connecticut Nevada 
Delaware New Hampshire 
Guam New Jersey 
Hawaii New Mexico 
Idaho North Carolina 
Indiana Oklahoma 
Iowa Oregon 
Kansas 
states in that some form 
Pennsylvania 
Puerto Rico 
South Carolina 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Utah 
Virginia 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
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in terms of the types of factors examined in securities 
registered for state approval. The following sections discuss 
those common factors. 
A. Uniform Securities Act Merit Standards and General Merit 
Standards 
Section 306(a)(2)(F) of the Uniform Securities Act incorpo-
rates merit standards as grounds for registration or denial of a 
proposed offering.20 Section 306(a)(2)(F) permits the state to 
deny registration if "the offering has been or would be made 
with unreasonable amounts of underwriters' and sellers' dis-
counts, commissions, or other compensation, or promoters' 
profits or participation, or unreasonable amounts and/or kinds 
of options".21 Some states go beyond the Uniform Securities 
Act standard and deny registration if the offering is not "fair, 
just and equitable."22 
These types of statutes afford administrators broad discre-
tion in their reviews of offerings and also afford administrators 
the latitude to develop specific topics for review. 23 Offerors 
who file for registration in even these general rule states will 
find themselves required to meet certain specific requirements 
(discussed below) or to negotiate additional conditions for the 
offering prior to the regulator's approval. In short, both the 
Uniform Securities Act and the "fair, just and equitable" stan-
dards provide state administrators with broad, discretionary 
review powers. 24 
Merit regulators, in addition to mandating the full disclo-
States without merit regulation can review proposed offerings only for full 
disclosure and fraud. Maryland and Illinois are examples of full disclosure states 
which parallel the federal disclosure standards. 
20. 7A U.L.A. at 621. 
21. Unif. Sec. Act § 306(a)(2)(F), 7A U.L.A. 621 (1978). 
22. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1260(a)(l) (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 551.-
2R(1)(e) (West 1991). 
23. See LOUIS Loss, CoMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 84-85 
(1976). 
24. It is the presence of this broad power that has been disturbing to acade-
micians and the focus of the scholarly debate on the subject. See, e.g., Mofsky and 
Tollison, supra note 4; Walker and Hadeway, supra note 6, and Goodkind, supra 
note 10. Judicial challenges to merit regulation have been minimal. Wisconsin's last 
reported case was Associated Gas and Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 266 N.W. 
205, 209 (Wis. 1936). Arizona's most recent case, Arizona Corp. Comm. v. Media 
Prods. Inc., 763 P.2d 527 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988), was not a challenge to the reg-
ulations themselves but rather a challenge to the jurisdiction of state regulators 
over interstate offerings. 
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sure of the Federal Securities Act of 1933,25 have the authori-
ty to employ substantive standards in reviewing proposed offer-
ings and in making decisions regarding the approval of the 
offering in their states. These substantive standards are the 
crux of the debate on merit review's "merits"26 and are dis-
cussed in the following sections. 
B. Capitalization Regulation 
One of the substantive standards employed by merit regu-
lators relates to the insufficiency of equity capital in relation to 
the total capitalization that will exist once the offering is com-
plete.27 Using quantitative standards (such as 10-15% of total 
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1988). 
26. For example, Mofsky and Tollison, supra note 4, state: 
Merit regulation has most often taken the form of rules regulating the 
maximum expenses of public offerings, requiring a minimum equity in-
vestment by promoters, regulating the price that insiders must pay for 
their stock relative to the proposed price for public investors; regulating 
securities offering prices in relation to earnings ratios, regulating the 
amount of warrants and options granted to officers, key employees and 
underwriters; establishing minimal shareholder voting rights; and regulat-
ing interest and dividend coverage with respect to senior securities. 
Beyond an efficient market type of criticism, merit rules have been 
criticized on the grounds that seasoned firms, not subject to the rules, are 
in effect granted a comparative advantage in raising capital over newly 
promoted ventures. Newly promoted firms must either adjust the terms of 
their offerings and their capital structures to the merit rules of particular 
states or be precluded from publicly offering their securities in those 
states. Some firms will thus always be at the margin where, for fmancial 
and legal reasons, corporate promoters are unwilling to make the adjust-
ment, and a decision not to offer securities in a particular state will be 
made. Of course, there are a few states that do not have merit rules, and 
it has been argued that a proposed offering could always be made there, 
thus avoiding merit regulation altogether. But practical considerations, 
relating mainly to the local nature of many small offerings, often foreclose 
capital formation any place except specific areas where the firm and its 
promoters are well known. There probably exists little geographic choice, 
based solely on evaluation of local blue sky laws, of the place where capi-
tal can be raised. 
ld. at 368-369 (footnotes omitted). 
27. For example, Missouri requires a 15% investment for aggregate offerings up 
to $1,000,000 and a 10% investment in the aggregate offering after $1,000,000. 
(Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 30-52.080(1) (1988)). Wisconsin has adopted NAASA's 
guidelines. (WIS. ADMIN. CODE § Comm'n of Sec. 3.05 (Jan. 1992)). Texas requires 
a minimum of 10% equity capital investment (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 113.3 
(1992)). Arizona has adopted the following schedule: 
10% of the first $200,000.00 
5% of the second $200,000.00 
1% of the balance. 
211] Merit Review of Common Stock Offerings 219 
capitalization), regulators are able to set the level of risk offer-
ors must assume in going public with the offering. 
C. Regulation of "Cheap Stock" 
Often referred to as "promotional securities,"28 "cheap 
stock" are securities issued to promoters and insiders at prices 
significantly less than the eventual public offering price.29 Al-
so part of this regulation is the review of means of payment by 
promoters-that is regulators are not only permitted to review 
the amount of stock but the means of payment and the value of 
services and tangible or intangible property given in exchange 
for the shares. 30 
D. Regulation of Options and Warrants 
Cheap stock regulation controls the amount of stock issued 
to promoters and insiders prior to the public offering. However, 
merit regulators also examine the number of options and war-
rants already issued or to be issued to insiders and promoters 
and the relation of those numbers to the total capital structure 
that will exist after the offering is complete.31 The options and 
ARIZ. COMP. ADMIN. R. & REGS. § R14-4-107 (A) (Supp. 1991). 
28. Cheap stock, also called "promotional securities," is defined as: 
[s]ecurities issued for services rendered, patents, copyrights or other in-
tangibles, the value of which has not been established to the satisfaction 
of the Commission by appraisals, by evidence of amounts paid by others 
for substantially similar services or property, by evidence of a bona fide 
offer to purchase such services or property, or by other evidence, or for a 
consideration substantially less in amount than the consideration for 
which such securities are proposed to be sold to the public .... 
Mo. CODE REUS. tit. 15, § 30-52.060 (1988). 
29. See Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 30-52.070 (1988) (limits cheap stock to 50%); 
WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 3.04 (1984) (adopts NAASA guidelines which limit cheap stock 
to 60%); ARIZ. COMP. ADMIN. R. & REGS. § R14-4-105 A.2 (Supp. 1991), which 
limits "promotional securities" to 15% of the outstanding securities (those that will 
be outstanding at the end of the offering). Texas allows for the escrow of cheap 
stock. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 113.3(5) (1992). 
30. Supra note 27, Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 30-52.060 (1988). 
31. Texas limits the number of options and warrants to 10% of the aggregate 
offering price with a maximum five-year exercise period. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit 7, § 
113.3(11)(1983). Wisconsin limits the number and value of warrants and options to 
20% of the total number of shares that will be outstanding after the offer and 20% 
of their value. WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 30.03(c)(1983). ARIZ. COMP. ADMIN. R. & REGS. 
§ R-14-4-106 B (Supp. 1991) allows such options, warrants and rights to purchase 
so long as: 
1. A certificate or instrument in evidence thereof is issued before the 
commencement of the proposed public offering. 
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warrants regulation, as well as the cheap stock limitations are 
designed to allow regulators to limit the amount of compensa-
tion and/or profit earned by promoters and insiders and are 
nearly universally raised in the review of the proposed offeri-
ng's documentation.32 
E. Offering Price Regulation 
Some state merit regulators have the authority to require 
an adjustment to market price if the proposed public offering 
price is too high in relation to the firm's current market price 
(for seasoned offerings) or in relation to the earnings history of 
those firms with no market history (unseasoned offerings).33 
This type of regulation is particularly disturbing to academi-
cians because of its direct interference with the market place, 
the efficient market hypothesis and the assignment of price 
based on past performance as opposed to consideration of fu-
ture market needs and changes.34 
F. Regulation of Underwriter's Commissions and I or Selling 
Expenses 
Excessive offering expenses, including underwriter's com-
missions, are items for merit review and are often subject to 
negotiation.35 These forms of regulation provide a means for 
2. The number of shares covered thereby does not exceed 20% of the 
number of securities to be outstanding at the completion of the proposed 
public offering. 
3. The initial exercise price is reasonably related to the public offering 
price. 
4. They do not exceed ten years in duration. 
5. The prospectus to be used in connection with the proposed public offer-
ing contains a full disclosure as to the terms and reasons for their grant. 
32. See Figure 2 and Tables XI-XIII infra and accompanying text for data on 
the number of option/warrant or cheap stock questions raised in the filings. 
33. See Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 30-52.050 (1990); (limits price to 25 times 
the average annual net earning~ per share); WIS. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.02(2), 
3.02(1)(a) (1984) (price must be "reasonably related" and "not exceed 25 times its 
average annual net earnings per share for the last 3 years"); TEX. ADMIN. CODE 
tit. 7, § 113.3(2) (1992) (allows examination of price earnings ratio over the past 
years). 
34. See Mofsky and Tollison, supra note 4, at 377-378. 
35. Mo CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 30-52.040 (1990) (15% limit); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
551.28CD (1988); WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 3.01 (1973) (commissions limited to 10% and 
other expenses to 15% of the aggregate offering price); ARK. REG. R. 14-4-108 (19-
72) provides: 
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regulating any excessive indirect profits to promoters and oth-
ers (as opposed to the more direct profits of "cheap stock" and 
options).36 
G. Regulation of Voting Rights 
Most merit states prohibit approval of offerings in which 
the purchasers of the shares will have no voting rights or will 
have voting rights disproportionate to those rights in previously 
issued shares. 37 These types of rules serve as a control mecha-
nism of promoters and existing shareholders so that the offer-
ing is not one used to raise capital that will be used at the 
discretion of existing shareholders without the requirement of 
new shareholder representation or accountability. 
H. Earnings Coverage Regulation 
This form of regulation is primarily used in proposed offer-
ings for preferred shares or debt securities. 38 Regulators ex-
amine a history of firm earnings to determine whether the 
earnings are sufficient to cover interest on the proposed debt 
securities or preferred dividends on the proposed equity pre-
ferred shares. 39 
A. No issuer shall incur a liability which must be paid by the issuer as a 
selling expense in connection with the sale of a public issuance greater 
than 15% of the amount of said issue actually sold to the public. 
B. Selling expenses shall include commissions, salaries, advertising and all 
other expenses directly or indirectly incurred in connection with the sale of 
securities ... 
36. Some states also prohibit officers and directors from earning commissions, 
see, e.g. ARIZ. COMP. ADMIN. R. & REGS. R14-4-111 (Supp. 1991); Unif. Sec. Act § 
306 (2)(F) (1958) prohibits "unreasonable amounts" of commissions and selling ex-
penses. 
37. See, e.g., Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 30-52.110 (1987) (unfair or dispropor-
tionate voting rights); WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 3.07(a)(1)(6) (1984) (prohibits giving no 
voting rights or unequal voting rights); TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 113.3(6) (1992) 
(prohibits "disproportionate" rights). 
38. As discussed in note 62 and accompanying text infra, these type of issues 
were not included in the study and this form of regulation was not used exten-
sively by regulators in reviewing common stock offerings except to note that the 
firm currently had difficulty meeting existing preferred dividend and debt securit-
ies' payments. 
39. See, e.g. Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 30, § 30-52.120 (1974) (uses a three-year test 
for earnings coverage); and WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 3.06(1)(1984) (net earnings for last 
3 years would be insufficient to cover debt interest). 
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I. Miscellaneous Regulation 
Most merit states, in addition to providing for regulation 
via the previous seven specific categories, also provide regula-
tors with a broad "miscellaneous" category for use in the review 
of proposed offerings. Some factors examined in this category 
include poor or unsound financial condition, the improbability 
of the offeror succeeding, or unfair transactions by insiders.40 
Financial requirements and evidence of promoter experience 
are mandated in some states as part of their miscellaneous 
regulations. 41 
This category of regulation affords administrators in merit 
states broad discretion in evaluating offerings. For example, in 
the present study, Arizona regulators examined issues such as 
loans to officers, affiliates and shareholders, transactions be-
tween the offeror and its affiliates, and the number of offerings 
made by an offeror in recent periods.42 
Also appropriately discussed here are the detailed requests 
for information and corrections that comprise part of the merit 
review process. For example, Arizona's routine check list for 
initial review of an offering includes items such as correction of 
the language for consent to service of process,43 requests for 
40. In many states, the "miscellaneous" category is not a codified concept but a 
discretionary one usually found in the form of policy statements. The policy basis 
for this discretionary category can be found in 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 
'II 5151-5381# (1984). NAASA has also adopted certain policies with respect to this 
miscellaneous discretion. See, e.g. Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 9605 (1984), in which 
Arizona adopts NAASA policies: "NAASA statements of policy. The Securities Divi-
sion subscribes to the statements of policy adopted by (NAASA) relating to the reg-
istration of securities in Arizona except where in conflict with a state rule or regu-
lation." Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 9605 (1984). 
For a more detailed discussion of Arizona's discretionary review issues, see note 
62 infra and accompanying text. 
For other examples of state regulations, see, e.g., IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 510-
50.33-.40 (1983), as reported in 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 25,443-25,400. Iowa 
requires a promoter's investment of at least 10%; limits offering expenses to 7% of 
the first $500,000 in aggregate offering price and 5% of any aggregate price above 
that; employs a 3-year earning test for offering price and limits commissions to 
10% and options or warrants to 20% and requires cheap stock to go into escrow 
for 10 months. 
41. In Texas, real estate syndication promoters must contribute at least $50,000 
to the syndicate and have at least two years executive experience in real estate. 
TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 117.2(a) and (b) (1982). 
42. See text accompanying note 62 infra for details on offering reviews. 
43. Arizona Corporation Commission Form SR 000103 (copy available in offices 
of BYU J. PuB. L.) lists item 5 as "The Consent to Service of Process must name 
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market and underwriter information,44 requests for additional 
language in the prospectus,45 and requests for financial state-
ments.46 In short, the broad discretionary authority can result 
in a laboriously detailed review and many firms withdraw from 
Arizona after receipt of the request or requests in the standard 
checklist. 47 
III. PREVIOUS STUDIES OF MERIT EFFICACY 
To date, there have been three quantitative studies of the 
efficacy of merit review. The first such study was Goodkind's 
evaluation of Wisconsin's merit system.48 Goodkind compared 
the post offering financial performance of corporate issuers 
whose offerings were registered or withdrawn49 between 1968 
and 1971 in Wisconsin.50 Goodkind's financial analysis used 
price, book value and dividend distribution as the indices of 
firm performance.51 Goodkind also used a figure of a loss of 
75% of the stock's market value as an indicator of business 
failure, with 23.5% of the withdrawn firms found to be 
all members of the Arizona Corporation Commission." 
44. Item 6 of Form SR000103 provides: "The Division requests additional infor-
mation relating to the offering such as the names of the market makers, volume of 
transactions, and the underwriters memorandum." 
45. Item 8 of Form SR000103 provides: "Please represent in the prospectus that 
all future transactions with affiliates will be on terms no less favorable than could 
be obtained from unaffiliated parties." 
46. Item 10 of Form SR000103 provides: "The Securities Division requests the 
following exhibits: a. Financial statements in accordance with the requirements of 
A.R.S. Section 44-1894." 
47. See notes 62-64 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the data. 
48. Goodkind, supra note 10. 
49. Withdrawal is the fate of securities not approved by the state. No denials 
are recorded by Goodkind, or in the present study, (see notes 62-64 infra) because 
a firm faced with regulators unwilling to approve their offerings are able to with-
draw. Many firms withdraw if significant objections are raised rather than invest 
the time and effort required to address regulators' concerns. Further, a withdrawal 
may result because the offering is terminated due to market conditions, changes in 
the offeror's needs or underwriting difficulties. The reason for withdrawal is not 
always given in every file and for the most part, is accomplished by a letter noti-
!Ying the regulators of withdrawal. 
50. Goodkind also provides an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of 
the merit system of regulation. Goodkind, supra note 10, at 107-23. Other non-
quantitative reviews of merit standards include Rutherford B. Campbell, An Open 
Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10 J. OF CoRP. L. 553 (1985) and 
Jeffery T. Haughey and Kevin M. Veler, Blue Sky Laws and State Takeover Stat-
utes: New Importance for an Old Battleground, 7 J. OF CORP. L. 689 (1982). 
51. See Table I infra. 
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failures. 52 Critics have cited methodological flaws in Good-
kind's study53 and have also criticized its failure to recognize 
the additional consumer and societal costs of merit review. 54 
Walker and Hadaway's 1982 study of Texas merit review 
compared common stock offerings between 1975 and 1980.55 
Although Walker and Hadaway reached a different conclusion 
than Goodkind, their study was also criticized for its narrow 
focus in that partnership offerings were not examined and only 
corporate issues were reviewed. 56 
Jennings' and Kudla's 1983 study of Arizona's merit review 
process concluded that the financial performance of withdrawn 
offerings was better than the performance of registered offer-
ings57, but was criticized for its lack of significance due to low 
52. Goodkind, supra at note 10. 
53. Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 4, state: 
[T]he components of the study's empirical test are not designed to 
shed any light on the issue it purports to investigate, namely investor 
protection, even within a range of tolerable imprecision. Only one index of 
performance used in the study-stock price-is relevant. The other two 
indices used-dividend distribution and book value-are essentially mean-
ingless and misleading measurements in this context. 
!d. at 371. 
The Wisconsin study is so methodologically flawed that it yields no 
useful information on the very interesting problem it posed. 
!d. at 376. 
54. Mofsky and Tollison note: 
But it was not only methodology that flawed the Wisconsin study. It 
was also marred by a priori acceptance that blue sky regulation does not 
generate unintended costs for consumers and society generally. The study 
gathered data with respect to only one matter-whether investors who 
bought issues meeting Wisconsin's merit rules fared better than investors 
who bought issues denied registration in Wisconsin. 
!d. at 370. 
(Note: Although Mofsky and Tollison use the term "denied" in their critique, Good-
kind compared approved with withdrawn registrations because there were no de-
nials). 
55. 
56. 
Walker and Hadaway, supra note 6 at 652. 
Makens, supra note 10, notes: 
By limiting their review to corporate offerings, Walker and Hadaway 
focused on only a small percentage of the offerings filed in and subject to 
review by the Texas Securities Board. Although this study concluded that 
merit review as a whole is producing its intended result of "equiponderat-
ing their positions of the new and existing investors," it is impossible to 
reach a general policy determination on the basis of this evidence without 
a review of the performance of partnership as well as corporate issues. 
!d. at 455 (footnotes omitted). 
57. See Marianne M. Jennings, et. a!, Federalism to An Advantage: The Demise 
of State Blue Sky Laws Under the Uniform Securities Act, 19 AKRON L. REV. 395 
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response rates on the financial performance survey.58 
The Makens59 and Mofsky and Tollison60 critiques of the 
studies are the only remaining portions of the literature offer-
ing critiques on the quantitative analysis of merit review.61 A 
comparison of the factors analyzed and the conclusions in each 
of the studies is found in Table I. The present study addresses 
the omissions and criticisms of the previous studies. 
(1986) wherein the authors, in analyzing holding period returns noted: 
Although these results cannot be generalized because of the small 
sample sizes for the withdrawn group, these results suggest that the 
withdrawn firms did as well financially as the approved group and even 
better in year 1. 
Id. at 40R. 
58. Makens, supra note 10, stated: 
A 1983 study by Kudla and Jennings of Arizona registration process 
appears to be an unsuccessful attempt to provide support for a presump-
tion that merit regulation should be abolished. The authors attempted to 
compare the performance of issuers of registered and withdrawn offerings 
but it is difficult to attach any significance to their conclusions since they 
received a very poor response to their questionnaire. 
Id. at 456 (footnotes omitted). 
59. Supra note 10. 
60. Supra note 4 
61. The financial literature does include some studies of primary offerings. See, 
e.g., Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information 
and the Performance of New Issues, 79 AM. EcoN. REV. 295 (19R9). Additionally 
there are some general qualitative analyses regarding the precision and application 
of merit regulation. See, e.!J., Hal M. Bateman, State Securities Registration: An 
Unresolved Dilemma and a Sufifiestion for the Federal Securities Code, 27 Sw. L. J. 
759 (1973); Harold S. Bloomenthal, Blue Sky Regulation and the Theory of Overkill, 
15 WAYNE L. REV. 1447 (1969); Haughey & Veler, supra note 49, at 689; Rex A. 
Hurley & Carla Green, Florida's Response to the Need for Uniformity in Federal 
and State Securities Registration Exemption Requirements, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 
309 (1984); Mark A. Sargent, The Challenge to Merit Regulation · Part I, 12 SEC. 
REG. L.J. 276 (1984); and Richard B. Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & 
LEE 1. REV. 899 (1982). 
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TABLE I 
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH RESULTS FOR GOODKIND 
STUDY AND WALKER AND HADAWAY STUDY 
RESEARCH RESULTS OF 
Goodkind (1976) Walker and Hadaway (1981) Jennings and Kudla (1984) 
More than 39 percent of issuers Less than one percent of all approv- More than 25% of the with-
that were denied registration als went out of business, as com- drawn filing issuers could not 
could not be located or refused to pared with over 18 percent of all be located or did not respond 
respond to requests for inform a- withdrawals. to requests for information. 
tion as compared to only 14 per-
cent for the registered issuers. 
Cumulative dividends for the Approved firms paid higher divi- Holding period returns were 
three years expressed as a per- dends per share as a percent of offer- significantly higher in year 1 
centage of the offering price was ing price. for those securities with-
higher for the registered group. drawn from the registration 
process. 
Book value per share was ap- Withdrawn firms had a greater There were no significant 
proximately 19 percent higher decrease in book value per share as differences in holding period 
after three years for the regis- a percent of offering price. returns between withdrawn 
tered issuers. and approved firms in years 
2, 3, and 4. 
Average price after three years Approved firms had a more than Total assets of withdrawn 
was approximately 28 percent double increase in price per share as firms were smaller. 
higher for the registered issuers. a percent of offering price three 
years subsequent to the offering as 
compared to withdrawn firms. 
Market value of the registered Cumulative total returns, consider-
shares in the sample after 3 ing both capital appreciation and 
years had an average gain of dividends earned, were more than 
$725,506 per issue while the twice as high for the approved firms 
value of the shares denied regis- three years subsequent to the offer-
tration had an average Joss of ing as compared to the withdrawn 
$2,117,878 per issue. group. 
Issuers that were denied regis- Withdrawals for multiple merit 
tration because of multiple defi- standard reafwns had the worst price 
ciencies had a substantially performance of any group. 
poorer performance than the 
registered issues. 
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IV. PRESENT DATA -
DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
227 
All 1,807 common stock offerings registered with the Arizo-
na Securities Division between 1984 and 1987 were re-
viewed.62 Limited partnership, bond, and other types of non-
common stock offerings were examined for relative quantity 
figures and amounts.63 For this same period, there were 4,341 
non-common stock offerings, with 3,893 being approved and 
448 being withdrawn (no denials) with total in-state aggregate 
offering amounts (for non-common stock offerings) as depicted 
in Table II. The amounts of common stock offerings along with 
their approval/withdrawal rates are reflected in Table III. The 
number of seasoned offerings are also noted in Table Ill. 
Mter obtaining registration information from the Securities 
Division files, post-registration financial information was ob-
tained. Approximately 44% of the firms' financial data was 
available on the Compustat data base. Where Compustat infor-
mation was unavailable, individual firm contact was made. 
Yean; 
1984-1987 
TABLE II 
REGULATORY REVIEW OF 
NON-COMMON STOCK OFFERINGS 
Total Aggregate In-state Approved 
Offering amotlllt 
4341 $135,316,724,755 3893 
62. See explanation, infra, page 34. 
Withdrawn 
448 
63. As noted earlier (see notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text), the lack of 
partnership offerings was a criticism of the Walker and Hadaway study. However, 
the elimination of them from this study was due to the complexity of comparison 
because of factors like the lack of a market place price for comparison, the inabili-
ty to gather financial data and the inherent heterogeneous nature of offerings other 
than common stock. The only meaningful comparison would be whether the firms 
were still in business. It is, however, undeniable that a significant portion of cap-
ital raised in the state was done through non-common stock offerings and a lack of 
review of these offerings leaves unanswered questions. 
228 
Year 
19M-
1987 
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TABLE III 
SUMMARY OF REGULATORY REVIEW OF 
COMMON STOCK OFFERINGS 
TotaJ I Total I TotaJ II 
offenogs Approved** Withdrawn Seasoned Unseasoned Seasoned 
Approved Approved Withdrawn 
1807 1137 612 683 464 337 
Unseasoned 
Withdrawn 
275 
Mter attempted contact of the remaining non-Compustat 
firms (1013 or 56%), 227 (or 22.4% response rate) provided the 
same financial data included in Compustat. Financial data for 
1,021 or 56.5% of the offering firms were thus evaluated. Of 
the remaining 786 firms, 479 or 61% did not respond and could 
no longer be located using either the firm name, names of the 
CEOs and four other listed officers of the company or through 
contact with attorneys or other experts listed in the registra-
tion materials. 
While many conclusions could be drawn from the inability 
to locate these firms, the most logical one is that the firms are 
no longer on-going entities. Of the remaining 786 firms, 307 or 
39% (16.9% of the total firm universe) refused to provide data 
and 8 did not respond to requests64 or were excluded due to 
factors such as mergers, spin-offs and other corporate structur-
al changes that produced changes in the stocks' character that 
made comparison of performance from year-to-year 
impossible. 65 
64. The firms did respond to the survey, but they took the position that their 
financial figures were proprietary. This was an interesting posture given that the 
firms had registered public offerings in Arizona. 
65. For example, several of the firms' outstanding stock was purchased in ex-
change for shares of another company and they became subsidiaries with the par-
ent holding all shares (no longer traded). There was no continuing data in some 
cases; in others there were only consolidated financial statements. 
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V. FINANCIAL COMPARISONS 
Three different forms of financial comparisons were run on 
the approved vs. the withdrawn group66 of offerings as well as 
several subsets of that group. Subsets were created according 
to the objections raised by the Securities Division.67 The three 
forms of financial comparison were: growth in earnings per 
share (EPS), growth in dividends, and growth in stock price.68 
The growth was computed as the total growth in these three 
factors from the time of the offering (for share price) or from 
the time of initial EPS or dividend figures (in cases where the 
firm had no earnings record or dividends because the offering 
was an IP0).69 The growth figures for the total set of ap-
proved vs. withdrawn offerings are found in Tables IV-VI. 
66. In Arizona, as in the Goodkind/Wisconsin study, there were no registration 
denials, but both withdrawals and approvals were found. Reasons for withdrawal 
included: no explanation; change in firm plans; changes in the market; loss of the 
underwriter; withdrawal from Arizona with the offer proceeding in other jurisdic-
tions. 
67. See, pp. 32-34 mfra. 
68. It is important to note that the author is cognitive of the relationship be-
tween risk and earnings. The higher the risk associated with an offering, the grea-
ter the return on the investment. Simon, supra note 61, at 295 explains: 
Consider a security which has a 50 percent chance of being worth 
$100 and a fiO percent chance of being worthless. The rational investor 
will he willing to pay $fi0 for the issue. (All risk may he diversified). Ex 
post, if ex antP expectations are correct 50 percent of the investor's port-
folio is worth $0 and 50 percent is worth $100. There are no average 
"abnormal" gains or losses. The effects of the investor's uncertainty, how-
ever, are reflected in the dispersion of returns. She has earned 100 per-
cent on half of the securities and lost 100 percent on the remaining is-
sues. 
The growth was measured after three years. Measuring the results after one 
year yielded unsatisfactory results. This is best explained by the fact that IPOs 
(particularly newly founded firms) had not been operational long enough to supply 
figures at the same time comparisons could be done. 
69. IPO = initial primary offering. 
230 B.Y.U. Joumal of Public Law [Volume 7 
TABLE IV 
APPROVED vs. WITHDRAWN OFFERINGS 
THREE-YEAR COMPARISON 
DIVIDENDS 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error 
Mi.mmum Maximum T 
Approved 0.56137822 1.99031&41 0.07200708 15.1579 -2.1987 
Withdrawn 2.45510899 11.32170368 0.85829614 81.42999 -4.3450 
Prob > F' ., .0001 
Approved 
Withdrawn 
Prob > F' • .0002 
Approved 
Withdrawn 
Prob > F' • .0001 
TABLE V 
APPROVED vs. WITHDRAWN OFFERINGS 
THREE-YEAR COMPARISON 
SHARE PRICE 
Mean Standard Standard Minimum Maximum T 
Deviation E-rror 
11.062225 8.28948675 0.29474022 .062 66.00048 2.7001 
8.835903 10.2159255 0.77005436 .062 51.0000 3.0808 
TABLE VI 
APPROVED vs. WITHDRAWN OFFERINGS 
THREE-YEAR COMPARISON 
EPS (Fully Diluted) 
Mean Standard Standard Minimum M8J[imum T 
Deviation Error 
0.442820992 1.26802 0.4684 -9.309999 10.96099 0.8060 
0.32547005 1.80191 .1382 -15.82999 6.75999 1.0059 
F Prob 
>IT I 
.0202 
.0001 
F Prob 
>IT I 
0.0074 
0.0021 
F Prob 
>IT I 
0.4212 
0.3147 
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Share price for the two groups shows a near $3 disparity 
in- price at the end of three years, and a T-test comparing the 
two groups shows the significance of the difference. The with-
drawn offerings had a mean figure that was less for earnings 
per share, but the T test did not establish significance. The 
dividend level of the withdrawn shares is much higher and is 
significant. Thus, on a straight across-the-board comparison of 
approved vs. withdrawn offerings, the approved offerings per-
formed significantly better with the exception of earnings per 
share. However, the presence of the higher level of dividends 
can be expected as simply a function of the higher level of risk. 
The data was then examined to determine whether other 
independent variables produced similar results and hence 
could be an explanation for the performances of the approved 
offerings. The variable chosen was that of comparing the sea-
soned offerings with the unseasoned offerings. Tables VII-IX 
summarize the comparisons. 
TABLE VII 
SEASONED vs. UNSEASONED OFFERINGS 
THREE-YEAR COMPARISON 
DIVIDENDS 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Standard Minimum Maximum T 
Error 
SeQfioned .66774956 2.2596 0.88832 15.85399 -1.5139 
Unseasoned 1.45720949 8.7656 .51385 81.42999 -2.1395 
Prob > F' • .0001 
F Proh 
>IT I 
0.1311 
0.0327 
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Seab"tJned 
Un~;eafilmed 
Proh > F" = .Cl'2I57 
SeaHoned 
Unseasoned 
l~ob > F':: .0169 
Mt'IHI 
TABLE VIII 
SEASONED vs. UNSEASONED 
THREE-YEAR COMPARISON 
SHARE PRICE 
Standard Standard Mirumum Maximum 
fh•Vlfltwn Error 
1n.Han 8.HGHI1 .34158 .062 66.00 
10 ~4~4 8.3303~ .48666 .093 46.00 
Mean 
TABLE IX 
SEASONED vs. UNSEASONED 
THREE-YEAR COMPARISON 
EPS (fully diluted) 
Standard Standard Minimum Maximum 
Deviation Error 
4242 1.3216 .05228 -9.3099 10.9699 
.4141 1.4877 .08828 -15.8299 6.7599 
[Volume 7 
T F Prub 
>IT I 
1.004 0.3175 
0.9761 0.3293 
T F Prob 
>IT I 
.0959 .9236 
.1004 .9201 
Whether an offering is seasoned should affect the dividend 
rate. The new offerings should pay a higher dividend, such be-
ing a function of the risk associated with the offering. It is im-
portant to note in the seasoned vs. unseasoned comparison of 
dividends, as well as in the approved vs. withdrawn dividend 
comparison, that the high standard deviation for the with-
drawn offerings and unseasoned offerings indicates a greater 
number of outliers in terms of dividend level. 
Share prices for this group are virtually the same and no 
significance was found. The resultant share prices for both 
groups may be more a function of the market at the time of the 
offer and overall market losses in the Dow Jones Index of In-
dustrial Averages during this period. 
Surprisingly, earnings per share for the two groups are 
similar but not significant. Comparing seasoned and unsea-
soned offerings with the subset of approved and withdrawn of-
ferings produces the results shown in Table X. With respect to 
unseasoned offerings, it is clear that merit regulators are pro-
phetic in determining future market behavior of offerings. 
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An examination of the unseasoned offerings demonstrates 
that the withdrawn unseasoned offerings will decrease in 
share price overall and reach a far lesser price than their ap-
proved counterparts. Again, the difference in standard devia-
tions should be noted as indicative of a higher number of out-
liers in the unseasoned withdrawn categories. Also, the T-test 
failed to show significance in the relationship between sea-
soned offerings and higher share prices. 
Interestingly, there is no significant difference between the 
seasoned approved and seasoned withdrawn offerings. Howev-
er, the lack of difference may be explained by the fact that a 
larger number of the withdrawn offerings in the seasoned cate-
gory are withdrawn voluntarily due to market conditions as op-
posed to withdrawal after regulatory review and objection. 
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TABLE X 
SHARE PRICE COMPARISON 
THREE YEARS 
SEASONED 
Scaadard De'l'iatloa Scaadard Error Mtat-.a 
--
I 
0.44811480 0.00000791 -o.B75(Q(IOO 1.17'777778 1 
0.4044U9 0.08810491 -0.91798388 1.18818511 I 
TABLE XI 
SHARE PRICE COMPARISON 
THREE YEARS 
UNSEASONED 
Staadal'd DeTWioa Staadal'd Ezrc:r Mlal~~Na 
--
10.:119961817 .......... ·10.5..99994H1 ........... 
14.99807079 t.6Sltl0989 • 84.49985800 8.14S8S787 
"'"'~-~·'?''1'"1''-'' __ ,.....,,... ___ _ 
T I I' Frob> tTl 
0.8444 1 0.4018 
8.8410 I 0.4011 
T I'Prob> ITt 
0.1765 .. ..,. 
0.7181 0.4713 
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Further refinements in the offering group were necessary 
to accurately reflect the level of regulatory input. There are 
three types of reviews conducted by the Division. In type one, 
the review is limited, approval is achieved quickly and coin-
cides with SEC approval. In this type of review, there were no 
withdrawals and a total of 812 files. 
In the second type of review, the division's work is more 
comprehensive and results in approval only after additional in-
formation has been provided, specific questions answered, and 
concerns of the division addressed. Figure 1 lists the types of 
questions and requests for information found among this sec-
ond category of registrations. While offerings may be unique, 
the questions and requests for information appear to be uni-
versal. There were 553 offerings in this category; 195 were 
withdrawn and 358 or 64.7% were approved. It is important to 
note at this point that the Division's reviews of the proposed 
offerings appear to have been handled in a systematic fashion 
via forms and checklists that had examiners reviewing offering 
files using the same set of standardized criteria. This system-
atic approach was found to be near universal since 1983 and 
markedly different from the review process as it existed in the 
earlier Jennings/Kudla study. 
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FIGURE 1 
CATEGORY 2 REGISTRATION 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
REQUESTS AND QUESTIONS 
1. Failure to list all commissioners' names· 
[Volume 7 
2. Failure to provide copy of board resolution for the offering 
3. Failure to provide copy of corporate by-laws 
4. Failure to provide evidence of good standing (for foreign 
corporations) 
5. Failure to provide the name of a registered Arizona 
broker** 
6. Reasons for withdrawal of a previous proposed offering 
7. Pledge on future loan transactions (pledge to do arms' 
length paperwork on all loans to insiders) 
*The securities division is a part of the Arizona Corpora-
tion Commission, a regulatory body with diverse responsibili-
ties headed by 3 elected commissioners whose names must be 
listed on all filings with any division of the commission. 
**The division requires that a locally licensed broker be af-
filiated with the offering. 
In the third and final review category, the division ex-
pressed grave concerns about the offering. Four hundred sixty 
one of the total offerings examined fit into this category; the 
end result was withdrawal in 237 or 51.4% of the cases. The 
concems expressed in this third category parallel the Division's 
regulations; they are listed in Figure 2. 
Critical to the evaluation of the regulators' efficacy in the 
review process is the subset comparison of Category 3 offerings 
with the overall performance of approved offerings. It is in the 
Category 3 cases that regulators assume their most aggressive 
posture and most clearly state concerns about the proposed of-
fering. These comparisons of Category 3 offerings are found in 
Tables XII-XIV. In all three tables the comparisons are be-
tween the approved firms and the troubled firms in which 
regulators expressed one or more of the 15 concems found in 
Figure 2. 
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FIGURE 2 
THIRD CATEGORY DIVISION 
OBJECTIONS TO OFFERINGS 
1. Substantial dilution 
2. Excessive underwriters' compensation 
3. Earnings losses for three years 
4. Unsound financial condition 
5. Conflicts of interest 
6. Losses 
7. Cheap stock 
8. Litigation 
9. Officers' compensation excessive 
10. Loans to related parties 
11. Excessive warrants and options 
12. Excessive offering expense 
13. High risk offering 
237 
14. Promoter or officer under investigation in another state 
(sec uri ties) 
15. Firm under investigation (includes tax issues (sales & in-
come), and antitrust concerns) 
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Approved 
Troubled 
TABLE XII 
THREE-YEAR COMPARISON OF TROUBLED 
OFFERINGS WITH APPROVED OFFERINGS 
DIVIDENDS 
0.5613 
0.2621 
Standard 
Devtatwn 
1.9903 
1.2126 
Standard 
Error 
0.0720 
0.1231 
Minimum Max1mwn T 
15.1579 2.0976 
6.8689 1.4464 
Prob > F'"" .0001 
TABLE XIII 
F Prob 
>IT I 
0.0374 
0.1484 
THREE-YEAR COMPARISON OF 
TROUBLED OFFERINGS WITH APPROVED OFFERINGS 
SHARE PRICE 
Mean 
Approved 11.0622 
Troubled 5.490 
Standard 
Deviation 
8.289 
G.H53 
Standard 
Error 
.29474 
.6620 
Minimum Maximum T 
.062 66.000 7.6888 
.062 35.76 6.4923 
Prob > F' = .0064 
Approved 
Troubled 
TABLE XIV 
THREE-YEAR COMPARISON OF TROUBLED 
OFFERINGS WITH APPROVED OFFERINGS 
EARNINGS PER SHARE (Fully Diluted) 
Mean 
0.44282 
0.06278 
Standard 
Deviatton 
1.2580 
1.0282 
Standard 
Error 
0.04584 
0.1044 
Mirumum Ma.xUDum T 
-9.3099 10.9699 3.3329 
-3.5999 5.1699 2.8545 
Prob > F' •. 0141 
F Prob 
>IT I 
0.0001 
0.0001 
F Prob 
>IT I 
O.OOll 
0.0044 
l 
I 
l 
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TABLE XV 
SUMMARY OF PRESENT STUDY AND COMPARISON 
WITH 
Goodkind 
(1976) 
More than 39 percent of 
if:iiUers that were denied 
registratJon could not be 
located or refused to respond 
to request..s for information 
as compared to only 14 per· 
cent for the registered is&u-
Cumulative dividends for the 
three years expre&:Sed as a 
percentage of the offering 
price was higher for the 
registered group. 
Book value per share was 
approximately 19 percent 
higher after three years for 
the registered issuers. 
Average price after three 
years was approximately 28 
percent higher for the regis-
tered issuers. 
Market value of the regis-
tered shares in the sample 
after 3 years had an average 
gain of $726,506 per issue 
while the value of the shares 
denied registration had an 
average loSB of$2,117,878 
per L&e;ue. 
Issuers that were denied 
registraQcm because of multi-
ple deficiencies had a sub· 
stantially poorer peJfor-
mance than the registered 
i~~rues. 
PREVIOUS WORK 
RESEARCH RESULTS OF 
Walker and Hadaway 
(1981) 
Less than one percent of all 
approvals went out of buf>l.-
ness, as compared with over 
18 percent of all withdrawals. 
Approved firms paid higher 
dividends per share as a per-
cent of offering price. 
Withdrawn fin:ns had a great-
er decrease in book value per 
share as a percent of offering 
price. 
Approved firms had a more 
than double increase in price 
per share as a percent of 
offering price three years 
subsequent to the offering as 
compared to withdrawn firms. 
CumuJat.J.ve total returns, 
considering both capital ap-
preciation and dividends 
ean1ed, were more than twice 
as high for the approved 
firms three years subsequent 
to the offering as compared to 
the withdrawn group. 
Withdrawals for multiple 
merit standard reasoos had 
the worst price performance 
of any group. 
Jenn.ings and 
Kudla (1984) 
More than 25% of the 
withdrawn filing issu-
ers could not be located 
or did not respond to 
requests for mforma-
tion. 
Holdmg period returns 
were significantly high-
er in year 1 for those 
securities withdrawn 
from the registration 
process. 
There were no signifi. 
cant differences i.n 
holding period returns 
between withdrawn and 
approved firms in years 
2, 3, and 4. 
Total assets of Wlth· 
drawn firms were 
smaller. 
Jennings 
(1991) 
21% of withdrawn filing iEBu-
ers could not be located or 
dJd not respond. 
48.8% of issuers subjected to 
intense regulatory review 
could not be located or not 
not respond. 
66% of withdrawn issuers 
could not be located or did 
not respond. 
Difference 10 mean figures in 
dividends not attributable to 
status of approval or with-
drawal (appears to be a func· 
tion of market perceptiw of 
risk). 
Share prices for approved 
firms are higher at end of the 
three-year period (significant) 
Earnings per share higher 
for approved group but not 
attributsble to approved 
status. 
Withdrawals of troubled 
offerings (as deengnated by 
regulators) had a share price 
less·tllan half of approved 
offerings and earnings per 
share rnly 20% of approved 
offerings with dividends less 
than half (not significant). 
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Due to risk factors, dividend comparison yields no signifi-
cant results. However, with only slight differences in standard 
deviation, both share price and earnings per share are signifi-
cantly less for the troubled offerings. The level of significance 
is evidence of Arizona regulators' abilities to question correctly 
those offerings that prove to be poor performers as compared 
with approved offerings. Additionally, 225 or 48.8% of the 461 
offerings were in the group which remained unavailable after 
two and three-contact efforts. The highest levels of significance 
came in this comparison group and demonstrate regulator's 
ability to ferret out those offerings most likely to prove costly 
to investors. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A summary of the study results is found in Table XV. 
Among numerous other conclusions drawn from the study is 
one regarding the focus and purpose of merit review. There are 
two types of investors: (1) knowledgeable investors (those capa-
ble of paying for competent evaluations of securities offerings), 
and (2) all other investors. The knowledgeable investor is as 
capable as the Division of running standard reviews regarding 
earnings records, dilution, underwriters' compensation and 
loans to insiders. In fact, except in category 2 and 3 cases 
where the Division requests additional information, regulators 
have no more information the market has. 
On the other hand, there is a second type of investor-the 
investor who lacks either the skills necessary to evaluate an of-
fering or the financial means to pay for such an evaluation. 
For these investors, regulatory review provides the type of 
analysis that they are unable to perform or obtain. 
Merit review remains a controversial issue because its role 
remains unclear, and critics voice concerns regarding its indi-
rect impact and its costs. Regardless of the outcome of quanti-
tative comparisons and analysis, it is clear that there are sig-
nificant administrative costs associated with filings. These ad-
ministrative costs cannot be measured, nor can the effect they 
may have in precluding firms from registering offerings. Fur-
ther, merit review introduces an indirect form of regulation in 
that, for example, it serves as a control mechanism for compen-
sation of officers and directors through the direct limitations of 
commissions, warrants options and promotional stock. 
In many cases, these items are negotiated with regulators 
in order to obtain approval and market price controls are thus 
t 
t 
I 
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eliminated. Additionally, merit review may present unusual 
barriers for smaller firms that cannot qualify for an exemption 
and which, as a result, must carry registration costs. Nearly all 
merit states offer an exemption for national stock exchange 
firms. 70 The stringent exchange requirements preclude most 
new firms from meeting an exemption.71 
Many merit states employ a double standard when review-
ing new companies as opposed to companies with earnings re-
cords. These standards emerge in the forms of stricter registra-
tion requirements,72 impounds,73 or escrows.74 This form of 
regulation, based on size and lack of earnings, precludes inves-
tors from choosing a high-risk, possibly high-return invest-
ment. This form of regulation will exclude from the capital 
markets those firms with ideas but no capital. 
These barriers are costly in terms of innovation, entrepre-
neurship, and our ability to compete in the international mar-
kets. 75 The effect of these price, impound and escrow require-
70. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 409.402(a)(8) (1990), which exempts securities 
listed or approved for listing on the New York, American and Midwest Stock Ex-
changes. The statute empowered Missouri's administrator to add exchanges and the 
Pacific Coast Exchange was later added. Mo. CoDE REGS. tit. 30, § 30-54.060 (198-
0). 
71. For example, New York Stock Exchange has the following eligibility require-
ments: (a) 2,000 holders of 100 shares or more; (b) 1,100,000 shares publicly held; 
(c) market value of publicly held shares of at least $18,000,000. The Exchange does 
have an alternative method of establishing eligibility-(1) $18,000,000 in net tangi-
ble assets; (2) earning power before federal taxes of $2,500,000 in the last year 
and $2,000,000 in each of the two years preceding. The Exchange can also impose 
additional requirements for trading shares held in one concentrated geographic 
area. New York Stock Exchange Equity Products Listed Company Manual Supple-
ment, #2, §§ 101.00-104.00 (1985). 
72. One such restriction is to set the offering price at the price promoters and 
other insiders have paid. See, e.g. WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 3.02(2)(1984). 
73. Arizona regulators are permitted to impound funds as a condition for regis-
tration. The funds are held by a third party but cannot be released without autho-
rization from the administrator (for a maximum of 1 year). See ARIZ. ADM. COMP. 
R. & REGS. R14-4-112 (1985) and IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 510-50.31 (502) (1983). 
74. Escrow arrangements permit the administrator to hold the stock of promot-
ers in escrow as a condition of registration. The stock is released when the offeror 
establishes a satisfactory earning record for one year and is solvent. See, IOWA 
ADMIN. CoDE r. 510.50.37 (1983) and TEX ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 113.3 (5) (1992). 
75. Congress has recognized these peculiar problems of small business financ-
ing. In the Omnibus Small Business Capital Formation Act of 1980, the SEC re-
ceived Congressional authorization "to cooperate with any association composed of 
duly constituted representatives of state governments whose primary assignment is 
the regulation of securities business within those states" for purposes of "the de-
velopment of a uniform exemption from registration for small issuers which can be 
agreed upon among the several states or between the states and the Federal Gov-
ernment." 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(1) and (c)(3)(c) (1982). Regulation D was the result of 
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ments is administrative control of the risk that can be passed 
on to the public. For example, a firm with no history of earn-
ings may be forced to accept a price reduction from administra-
tors in order to obtain approval for an offering. 
Upon market release of the offering, the market could cre-
ate a "hot issue" if public perception of the quality of the offer-
ing differs from the perceptions of the administrators.76 The 
result is that the offeror clearly could have raised more capital 
with the profit from underpricing going to initial investors who 
immediately engage in secondary sales.77 If this be the case, 
administrators interfere with efficient market forces. When 
this type of interference is characterized as insider trading, it 
is considered so unfair as to constitute criminal conduct. 78 
The filings, follow-ups and registrations with merit admin-
istrators increase the overall offering costs and reduce net cap-
ital raised. Although there is a uniform application for state 
approval, there are no uniform standards; offerors are forced to 
negotiate on a state-by-state basis.79 Further, the presence of 
the generic "fair, just and equitable" standards offers adminis-
trators broad discretion80 and many offerings are approved in 
some jurisdictions but withdrawn in others.81 Many adminis-
trators base their reviews on years of experience and some crit-
ics note there is no indication they are any more able to pre-
dict risk. 82 
cooperative efforts. See, supra, notes 14-17 and accompanying text. 
76. A "hot issue" is one that sells at a price above the established price for the 
offering because public (market) perception is that the issue to worth more. 
77. Bloomenthal, supra note 60, at 1486. 
7R. Federal registration provides for full disclosure--a premise in the efficient 
market hypothesis and fully supported by market theorists. Beyond full disclosure, 
manipulation and elimination accomplished by merit standards, creates the second-
ary sales profit noted earlier. See notes 76 & 77, supra, and accompanying text. 
79. Bateman, supra note 61, at 781. 
80. For example Loss and Cowett note: "A mid·Nestern administrator replied 
that he looked on uranium issues with a jaundiced eye' and disapproved them 
"unless they are of such a nature that we might be tempted to invest our own 
money in them." Loss & Cowett, supra note 6, at 77. 
81. Some "merit review" states are simply full disclosure states since merit 
standards are not always applied. For example, Maryland is listed as an 
antifraud/disclosure state with a "fair, just and equitable" standard but allows 
registration by coordination-the state offering is effective upon SEC registration. 
See MD. CORPS & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-502, 503 (19R5 & Supp. 1990). 
82. Mofsky states: [State] administrators are no better able than anyone else to 
evaluate the riskiness of a given venture. If they were, it is unlikely that they 
would be administering the securities law rather than maximizing their wealth in 
a more profitable way. James F. Mofsky, Reform of the Florida Securities Law, 2 
1 
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It is clear, however, from the Arizona experience, that 
when regulators target a particular proposed offering because 
of serious or multiple concerns (as listed in Figure 2), their re-
cord is nearly perfect. This area of their work is perhaps the 
most relevant in an analysis of their efficacy. Because with-
drawals are often voluntary, a comparison of approved offer-
ings with withdrawn offerings necessarily groups together of-
ferings that are heterogeneous. A withdrawal may follow a re-
quest for information as a means of avoiding administrative 
costs and focusing attention on the offering in other states. 
However, it is important to note that fully 224, or 48.5% of 
these troubled offerings were still eventually approved and 237 
or 51.4% of them fell into the category of companies that could 
not be located. 
One of the more interesting findings of the study is that 
dividend rates for the withdrawn and troubled offerings are 
higher, a reflection of market perception of higher risk and 
hence a mandated higher rate of return. The philosophical 
questions remain about the right to earn that higher rate of re-
turn and the heterogeneity of investor goals. 
The more appropriate question is not whether regulators 
are able to screen every offering to maximize investment po-
tential, but whether regulators can actively prevent poor in-
vestment decisions regardless of goals. It is clear from their re-
cord on multiple problem offerings that Arizona regulators can 
help to prevent such poor decisions. The follow-up question is 
whether pre-screening is more effective and less costly than 
post-offering enforcement action. 
While the academic debate may continue, for those who 
are saved from a bad investment, the answer is that an effec-
tive regulatory system is in place that serves to prevent inves-
tor losses. Public gratitude for and perception about that sys-
tem cannot be underestimated-particularly in those states in 
which regulators report directly to elected officials. 
An examination of the Arizona review process and its often 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 80 (1974). See also Robert H. Edwards, California Measures 
the Uniform Securities Act Against Its Corporate Securities Law, 15 Bus. L. 814 
(1960). 
Edwards noted: "The commissioner had established specific little rules that had 
to be followed by the deputies, who could not really exercise basic judgement on 
the merits of the security as a whole." 
ld. at 828. 
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too-detailed requests of registrants raises the issue of whether 
a high success rate could be achieved if regulators would focus 
more on problem offerings and less on crossing "t's" and dot-
ting "i's." Troublesome and time-costly barriers of regulatory 
details should not be underestimated. The investigation of sub-
stantive questions would likely render a more efficient use of 
administrative resources by returning more effective capital 
deterrents. 
